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Book Reviews 
Ben Jonson: A Life by David Riggs. Cambridge and London: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1989. Pp. xi + 399. $35.00 (cloth). 
Ben Jonson and the Poetics of Patronage by Robert C. Evans. Lewisburg: Buck-
nell Univ. Press, 1989. Pp. 334. $45.00 (cloth). 
David Riggs's new biography of jonson, and Robert Evans's study of the 
poet's engagement in the politics of patronage build on and extend the new 
historicism's attempts to universalize courtly power politics as the dominant 
matrix producing much late Renaissance English writing. Having adopted 
Michel Foucault's model of textuality as a form of political power, the new 
historicists have sought to reveal in the writing of Spenser, Shakespeare, 
Donne, and jonson (to name the most important figures) their domination by 
an ideology of hierarchical power invested in courtly patronage, itself a 
reflection of the power politics indigenous to monarchal governments and 
aristocratic establishments. 
David Riggs's is the fullest account of jonson's life we have to date. It fol-
lows hard upon Rosalind Miles, Ben Jonson: His Life and Work published in 
1986, and like Miles Riggs produces a complete narrative life by placing jon-
son's literary productions in the context of historical and literary events of 
Jonson's own time. While neither Riggs nor Miles uncover new biographical 
evidence other than that already contained in the Herford-Simpson Oxford 
edition of jonson, the Jonson Allusion Book, and scattered biographical mono-
graphs, Riggs's biography should now be held the preferred account by rea-
son of the mass of historical material with which he fuses his account of Jon-
son's life and literary career. 
Riggs's account nevertheless opens itself to question on two scores, First, 
regarding aspects of jonson's life for which he has no independent data, he 
relies on questionable psycholanalytic interpretations of his literary works in 
order to glean from them reflections of Jonson's inner life. Second, he uncriti-
cally assumes the politicS of ressentiment privileged by the new historicism 
and insists that "the dominant motifs of Jonson's profession life are social and 
literary ambition" (2). Expounding a position elaborated fully in Evans's 
study of Jonson's nondramatic poetry, Riggs sees reflected in Jonson's writing 
primarily his "ultimate, and unrealizable, ambition ... to transcend his ori-
gins," an ambition characterized as "the drive towards a vindictive triumph" 
(3). As Riggs says, "this young man bore a heavy load of resentment" (18) 
that produced the desire to achieve courtly status and patronage at the cost 
of his ethical integrity. Riggs finds, for instance, that by the time he came to 
write the early masques Jonson "now realized that praise and blame were po-
litically charged rhetorical formulas that he could adapt to suit any occasion" 
(147), and Riggs argues that "however stridently he asserts his independence, 
his writing is bound to reflect the preferences of his patrons" (205). 
While there is no question that Jonson was driven by ambition for courtly 
patronage, as were many writers and humanist scholars during the Renais-
sance, the particular interpretation Riggs gives this ambition only succeeds in 
calling into question Jonson's ethical integrity, and by extension the literary 
worth of his writing. Like Evans, Riggs finds little of interest in jonson's 
plays, masques, and poems beyond their usefulness in unmasking his neu-
rotic obsessions. Where Evans limits these obsessions to resentment at and 
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pursuit of "personal power," Riggs takes a psychoanalytic perspective in 
which childhood traumas are largely determinative. Thus jonson's adulterous 
escapades enact his Oedipal rage against his stepfather by cuckolding other 
husbands (19). His "infantile resentments" generate obsession with excrement 
because he had spent his childhood next to an open sewer (62). In Poetaster 
"instead of killing his enemy he sublimated his aggressive energies in his art, 
just as he had done in his three earlier comedies" (80). He links jonson's put-
ative obsession with the deaths of children and a lost play about Richard III, 
which also dealt with infantile mortality, thereby satisfying "the criteria that 
were uppermost in jonson's mind" (91). 
Psychobiography is a sometimes useful form of biographical investigation, 
if difficult to bring off convincingly. The foundations of Riggs's psychological 
speculations, however, are shallow and unexamined but might nevertheless 
persuade were his analyses of the plays he calls to witness these speculations 
carried out with full recognition of their formal and thematic complexities. 
Riggs exhibits a limited knowledge of the vast literature on jonson's works, 
sometimes citing uncritically a single book or article as the foundation of his 
own interpretations. (Typical in this regard is his unexamined acceptance of 
the Catiline-Guy Fawkes connection argued by Barbara Del.una in jonson's 
Romish Plot: A Study of "Catiline" and Its Historical Context [1967], 176.) 
The result is a biography certainly useful for its assemblage of the histori-
cal contexts that impinge on Jonson's career, but seriously questionable in its 
interpretations of the literary productions that constituted that career. Riggs's 
attempts at psychobiography may persuade those who are persuaded by 
such efforts. But his interpretation of jonson's career as motivated by the will 
to power needs careful scrutiny. Such scrutiny and revision as Riggs's biogra-
phy invites become a crying need in the case of Robert Evans's study of jon-
son's poetry, where Riggs's perspective and approach are pushed to dubious 
extremes, and where the enterprise of new historicism is itself laid seriously 
open to question. 
Evans applies to Renaissance courtly patronage modem sociological analy-
sis of "self-presentation" derived from the work of Erving Goffman (1959) 
and that of other sociologists following Goffman, e.g., Edward jones (Ingra-
tiation [1964]). In this scenario of social interaction rivalry and striving for 
"personal power" are fueled by promises of personal advancement and 
threats of personal sanction indigenous to Renaissance patronage systems. 
Evans reads jonson as totally dominated by such promises and threats, with 
the consequence that all his literary works-plays and masques as well as 
poetry-become nothing more than strategies for personal advancement. 
Taking his cue mainly from Frank Whigham's Ambition and Privilege: The So-
cial Tropes of Elizabethan Courtesy Theory (1984), but continuing a line of 
analysis already developed by earlier new historicist scholarship, Evans gives 
us a jonson who, though a courtly sychophant and flatterer, nevertheless 
strives to maintain the public persona of a poet independent of the need for 
such striving. Evans finds new complexity in Jonson's poetry by reading it as 
at once embodying various strategies of "self-promotion," and seeking to con-
ceal such strategies behind the constructed persona of an independent, cen-
tered self. 
Evans's "micropolitical" model of self-presentation has already been ana-
» 
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lyzed before Goffman by the philosopher Max Scheler in his book entitled 
Ressentiment (English trans. 1961], a work which is indebted in turn to 
Nietzsche's analysis of slave morality in The Genealogy of Morals. Ressenti-
ment means not simply "resentment," which refers to localized and tempo-
rary hostilities between two individuals or groups. Ressentiment is rather a 
global condition of a society that invests all members with a sense of per-
sonal inadequacy and the consequent need to compensate for it. It is a char-
acteristic of any hierarchical social structure in which sado/masochistic rela-
tions dominate. Each individual masochistically accepts the deflation of self 
imposed by those above him/her, and in turn relays this deflation sadisti-
cally to those below. 
Evans's micropolitical analysis emphasizes the devaluation of the individ-
ual in a courtly context. This devaluation drives him/her to seek validation 
in the eyes of an alien Other who consequently takes on a radically divided 
function: it confers a sense of self on the subject, while being the object of 
the subject's envy and hatred. This hatred in tum generates the need to un-
mask the Other's power and reduce it to a form of micropolitical power play 
in turn. Thus far Evans's analysis extends. 
However, Scheler's analysis of ressentiment goes beyond Evans's discus-
sion, and discloses its unacknowledged assumptions. The radical source of 
ressentiment, and of the "micropolitical" social structures that Evans posits as 
universal, is self-loathing. The person of ressentiment in Scheler's account al-
ways sees himself/herself through the eyes of an Other. This alienation of 
self from self nevertheless involves a corresponding projecton of the self's 
self-loathing onto this Other, so that the denigrating glance of the Other has 
no content save that invested in it by the subject. Ressentiment in short is a 
form of narcissistic paranoia. Having no sense of self-identity save that con-
ferred by others, the subject at once (1) projects self-loathing onto others, (2) 
interprets the denigratory judgment of the alien Other as something indepen-
dent of the self, (3) seeks the approval of the Other, and (4) calls the Other's 
capacity to confer this approval into question by unmasking the Other's 
power as itself a function of paranoiac self-presentation. 
Evans's analysis assumes these projections and takes them for granted 
without making them explicit. He continually uses such terms as "power/ 
"self/ and particularly Uattraction/ without explaining what these words 
mean in the context of his argument. Clearly, in Evans's world of courtly res-
sentiment the powerful person is the "attractiven person who does not need 
(Le., does not appear to need) the regard (view, valuation) of others. On the 
contrary, as Evans says repeatedly, all independence of ressentiment is itself a 
pretense. Evans's analysis reflects current new historical discussions of the 
Renaissance court, which demystify patronage as a form of power grounded 
in the illusion of a transcendent, independent subject. Power becomes rela-
tional rather than substantive, something invested in networks of social inter-
actions rather than invested indigenously in persons. "Power" is conse-
quently possessed by no one and can be conferred by no one, and yet it 
comes into existence through interaction among these individuals. The new 
historicism situates a contradictory conception of power at the center of its 
own analysis: others possess powerl others do not possess power. Evans's 
study makes explicit this contradiction in varying degrees implicit in other 
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new historicist studies of Renaissance literature. Since Evans does not query 
the source of the 'power" which the courtier/poet seeks to tap, he has no oc-
casion to note that his own model denies that any such source exists. 
Whether patronage systems, at Renaissance courts or elsewhere, are 
wholly reducible to the micropolitics of ressentiment is highly questionable. 
Though Evans cites in a footnote the seminal work of S. N. Eisenstadt and 
L. Roniger (Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Struc-
ture of Trust in Society [Cambridge, 1984]), he seems not to have taken its 
complex import into account. Patron-client relations, wherever they have oc-
curred, run a large spectrum from the totalitarian to equality, and from domi-
nance to friendship, and this study clearly shows that relations characterized 
by ressentiment are by no means the norm. While Evans supports his analy-
ses of individual poems with a wealth of anecdote regarding power struggles 
at the jacobean court, and in this makes a significant contribution to our un-
derstanding of the background of jonson's own literary career, he single-
mindedly interprets these anecdotes as exemplary of micropolitical ressenti-
ment. 
Regarding the poems and masques that reflect jonson's own relations with 
friends, literary rivals, aristocratic patrons, and with the King himself, Evans's 
analysis is equally thesis-ridden: in each and every case jonson constructs a 
self and an address whose sole purpose is ·self-promotion." Indicative of Ev-
ans's tunnel-vision on these matters is his neglecting to examine in detail 
jonson's most important poetic statement on patronage, "An Epistle to Sir 
Edward Sacvile." Deriving it largely from Seneca's De beneficiis (a work that 
Evans likewise cites but seems not to have taken seriously), jonson critiques 
the ways in which patronage relations can degenerate into "micropolitical" 
power struggles, and also the attitudes on the part of both patron and client 
necessary to avoid such degeneration. 
It is consequently important that, having reduced jonson's literary works to 
nothing but rhetorical forms of self-promotion, Evans is left with the single 
most important feature of these works to explain, namely their collective lit-
erary excellence. Arguing that the poetic power of jonson's verse functions as 
a strategy of self-promotion, the poetic "complexity" Evans purports to find in 
jonson's poetry means the unconscious simulative and dissimulative strate-
gies elicited by the will at once to display and conceal the self. The key word 
here is "unconscious," and Evans does not shrink from accusing Jonson of 
being unaware of what he is doing when he writes his poems. Clearly the 
priorities of literary analysis have been inverted when the reader discovers 
Evans commenting on jonson's poetic genius only to assert in effect that jon-
son is being a great poet just in order to "promote" his "power" as a great 
poet. Evans's micropolitical analysis cannot encompass jonson's greatness as 
a poet, a greatness which, in truly constituting his personal power, makes 
him to that extent independent of Evans's micropolitical model. 
The all-pervading politics of ressentiment governing court life a.t the turn of 
the seventeenth century which the new historicists take as ultimate is in 
effect a form of Renaissance self-fashioning that jonson has already decon-
structed, and credited to a cringing and envious complicity with structures of 
power and status that are empty because empty of a self-validated self. The 
new historicism has in effect rewritten jonson's satirical poems for him, but 
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without taking cognizance of the positive values that alone give these satiri-
cal poems their ethical force. And Evans's failure to account for Jonson's liter-
ary achievement is symptomatic of the new historicism's larger failure to en-
compass Jonson's literary and ethical stature. 
Specifically, Evans's umicropolitics" cannot register the Renaissance hu-
manist enterprise that constitutes the self in its own intellectual labor inde-
pendent of established socio-political power structures. Though subject in 
various ways to the power of patronage, many humanist intellectuals and 
artists along with Jonson were independent in spirit of this power, and 
defined their ethical norms particularly against the ressentiment these struc-
tures generate. And no one saw more incisively than Jonson through the 
signs of nobility with which an increasingly degenerate aristocracy cloaked 
its unworthiness to retain the privileges of governance. The claims of these 
humanist new men, including Jonson, rested not a little on the intellectual 
labor by which they defined their own true nobility against the false nobility 
of courtly power, and consequently against the politics of ressentiment which 
Evans's new historicism predicates of them. 
Marquette University Michael McCanles 
Coleridge and Wordsworth: A Lyrical Dialogue by Paul Magnuson. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988. Pp. xiv + 330. $35.00 (cloth). 
For many years scholars have been aware of the unique literary relation-
ship between Coleridge and Wordsworth, who, as Thomas McFarland re-
marked, Unot only pervasively influenced one another; they did so in a way 
that challenges ordinary methods of assessment" ("The Symbiosis of Cole-
ridge and Wordsworth: SiR 2 [1972]: 263). Coleridge and Wordsworth 
identified so closely with one another that in many instances critics have had 
difficulties differentiating between a Wordsworthian or Coleridgean persona 
in a particular text, or even establishing with certainty the authorship of 
given poems (see e.g., the controversy between David Erdman and Stephen 
Maxfield Parrish in ·Who Wrote The Mad Monk?: A Debate: BNYPL 64 
[1960]). In his recent study, Paul Magnuson renders such controversies point-
less, arguing that Coleridge's and Wordsworth's poetry should be regarded as 
a single work, constituted by two voices Simultaneously, each having its 
source in the other in the same way that stanzas of an ode are mutually in-
terdependent. Magnuson proposes a new methodology for reading Cole-
ridge's and Wordsworth's poetry as an extended lyrical dialogue that enabled 
each poet to produce more writing by alluding to, appropriating, negating 
and redirecting the utterance of the other. Essential to this methodology is 
the emphasis on earlier or contemporaneous writing as a context for given 
poems, an emphasis which displaces a concern with authorial intention in a 
single work. For Magnuson, no poem exists in isolation from other writing; 
·its borders blend with those of poems it echoes and anticipates, and its reso-
lutions are undone by work that follows· (28). The relevant context for a par-
ticular poem is often constituted by fragments, drafts and works in progress 
m 
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which Magnuson considers to be as significant to a dialogic reading of the 
Coleridge-Wordsworth canon as completed poems. What matters to Magnu-
son most is a principle of ongoing productivity, i.e. texts that engender fur-
ther texts, be they fragments or full poems. This perspective enables Magnu-
son to reassess the status of a number of poems in the Coleridge-Wordsworth 
canon. Unlike Parrish, for example, Magnuson regards the poems of the first 
volume of the Lyrical Ballads as less important (with the exception of "Tintem 
Abbey") than those of the second volume because they were "not generative 
of further poetry" (21). On the other hand, "Home at Grasmere," a flawed 
poem according to some critics, is in Magnuson's opinion highly significant 
as a response to Coleridge's "Reflections on Having Left a Place of 
Retirement" and as a source for the opening stanzas of "The Immortality 
Ode," while the first version of Wordsworth's "The Discharged Soldier" pro-
vides a far more radical response to liThe Rime of the Ancient Mariner" than 
"Peter Bell." 
Although the methodology adopted by Magnuson is vulnerable to a num-
ber of objections, his study offers one of the most challenging, innovative 
and in-depth analyses of Coleridge's and Wordsworth's relationship that has 
yet appeared. In virtually every chapter the reader will find new points of 
view on well-known poems and valuable corrections to previous readings 
shared by many critics. Magnuson is the only critic among those who have 
dealt with the Coleridge-Wordsworth dialogue who analyzes extensively the 
earliest versions of poems and sundry fragments by both poets, and his 
findings in this area constitute a major contribution to our understanding of 
the writers' debts to one another. 
It is fair to say that although Magnuson tries to sidestep the debate as to 
whether Coleridge formed deeper dependencies on Wordsworth or vice 
versa, his study offers conclusive evidence that Wordsworth benefited more 
from his dialogue with Coleridge than did his partner. Coleridge'S poetry, 
Magnuson claims, "was the prime influence on Wordsworth's from the first 
days of their association until the winter of 1799-1800, when Wordsworth 
began to describe himself as a self-generated poet" (10). After a preliminary 
discussion of his methodology, Magnuson begins with a chapter on the rela-
tionship between the "Salisbury Plain" poems and "Religious Musings," and 
between The Borderers and Osorio. He locates the source of the entire narra-
tive of "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" in the revisions of the early ver-
sions of "Salisbury Plain," which shift the emphasis from the social conse-
quences of war to the psychological disturbances caused by guit and terror 
on an individual. At the same time, Magnuson demonstrates that "Religious 
Musings" had a profound influence on Wordsworth's subsequent writings, 
teaching the poet how one could sustain human sympathy at a time of social 
disintegration and change terror into hope and awe. In other words, during 
the early phase of their interaction, Coleridge absorbed Wordsworth's private 
pessimism at the very time when Wordsworth embraced Coleridge's public 
optimism as an antidote to his mood in 1796. In his discussion of The Border-
ers, Magnuson challenges the widely held critical opinion that the play repre-
sents a warning against the abuse of the intellect, arguing that the 1797 ver-
sion, as Coleridge correctly interpreted it, "offered the temptation to a crime, 
not through liberation of the intellect, but through liberation of the imagina-
tion to reach for sublimity" (55). 
r 
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In chapter 3 Magnuson documents further the relationship between "The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner" and the "Salisbury Plain" poems, showing how 
Coleridge redefined the theme of Wordsworth's poems by insisting that 
suffering can acquire a voice. This in tum generated a response from Words-
worth, who in "The Discharged Soldier" naturalized the alienated figure of 
the wandering mariner and restored the connection between character and 
voice, which remained dissociated in Coleridge's narrative. The important 
point raised by this chapter is that some of the most productive moments in 
the dialogue between Coleridge and Wordsworth involved works which were 
at a stage of transition from one version to another, or were not yet com-
pleted. Thus, Wordsworth's sailor becomes Coleridge's mariner at the point 
of transition between "Salisbury Plain" and" Adventures on Salisbury Plain, n 
while Wordsworth appropriates the figure of the mariner from Coleridge be-
fore "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" was actually completed. 
In chapter 4 Magnuson presents a most unusual pairing of dialogic poems, 
arguing that "Christabel" is in essence Coleridge's version of the central 
themes of "The Ruined Cottage," namely loss of hope, wandering and the 
terror of a figure detached from a natural landscape. This is in my view the 
least convincing chapter of the book. Surely Christabe!'s wandering and 
sense of shame have a different source from Margaret's in Wordsworth's 
poem, and the rubric under which both poems are classified as "anatomies of 
hope and despair" is too general to be very meaningful. While it is true that 
Margaret's constant wandering in search of her husband renders her prey to 
"passive despair" and "severe disorientation," it could be said that Christa-
bel's act of leaving the death-in-life sterile atmosphere of the castle, however 
disastrous in the long run, is not aimless. Like Blake's Thel, Christabel is at 
the point of transition between innocence and experience, but unlike Blake's 
heroine, she takes the full plunge into the terrifying mysteries of sexuality. 
Wordsworth was closer to the truth than Magnuson when he sensed in 
"Christabel" such a divergent imaginative universe from his own that he ex-
cluded the poem from the second edition of the Lyrical Ballads. 
Magnuson makes a more plausible case in chapter 5, where he links "The 
Ruined Cottage" and Coleridge's conversation poems, to which Wordsworth 
turned repeatedly for a conclusion to Margaret's story. This chapter focuses 
on the differences between Wordsworth's literal conception of nature's lan-
guage and Coleridge's figural representation and demonstrates persuasively 
that in appropriating the figure of the Eolian harp, Wordsworth both invests 
it with a centrality it did not originally possess in the 1796 version of Cole-
ridge's poem ("Effusion XXXV"), and divests it of the qualifications and 
doubts that are evident both from the poem itself and from its location in the 
sequence of poems Coleridge devised for his 1797 volume. The rest of the 
chapter presents a reading of "Tintern Abbey" as a response to "Frost at Mid-
night," advancing the claim that the most radical challenge posed by Cole-
ridge's poem for Wordsworth was the threat of dissociated lyric moments 
that could dissipate into nothingness in the absence of a coherent artistic 
form. It was this problem that Wordsworth faced in the early drafts of The 
Prelude, a matter Magnuson takes up in chapter 6, arguably his best and 
most provocative chapter. Here Magnuson shows that Wordsworth's effort to 
free himself from Coleridge'S influence by turning to his own childhood for 
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sources of creativity actually rendered him even more dependent on Cole-
ridge than before, for his recollections of childhood turned out to be recollec-
tions of other texts of childhood, primarily Coleridge's. Hence Wordsworth 
encountered an increasingly uneasy sense of their fictional status and came to 
realize that the structuring of his text was the only reliable prop against 'the 
fragmentary nature of recollection'. As Wordsworth discovered that neither 
nature, nor memory or imagination could provide unity to a disjointed state 
of consciousness, the 'ground for his text became an ordering of the frag-
ments, a textual, not a psychological or phenomenological principle' (227). 
The remaining three chapter~ take up the history of Wordsworth's sus-
tained though not entirely successful efforts to dissociate himself from Cole-
ridge. In chapter 7 Magnuson discusses Wordsworth's aggressive attempt to 
found the myth of a self-generated poet in 'Home at Grasmere' and the dis-
crepancies between the themes of volume I and II of the Lyrical Ballads. 
Chapter 8 deals as closely with Wordsworth's exchange with Coleridge in 
1802 (articulated in 'Dejection: An Ode: in 'Ode: Intimations of Immortal-
ity" and in 'Resolution and Independence") as with Wordsworth's dialogue 
with his own poetry, showing how the 'Immortality' ode reverses the 
confid.ent affirmations of uHome at Grasmere' and how in his revisions of 
UThe Leech-Gatherer' Wordsworth called into question the "easy, uncon-
scious naturalism" characteristic of his earlier beliefs. The same focus on the 
revisionary nature of Wordsworth's poetry informs Magnuson's concluding 
chapter in which he places the Arab dream episode of The Prelude in a lyric 
sequence including the completion of the 'Immortality" ode, the drafts of the 
dedication scene, the meeting with the discharged soldier and the ascent of 
Snowdon, all composed in February and March 1804. 
Uke other studies that propose a revision of the established critical canon, 
Magnuson's book is bound to excite some readers and displease others. Com-
mitted Wordsworth enthusiasts might conceivably respond negatively to 
Magnuson's overt partiality to Coleridge. Magnuson often condemns Words-
worth for his literalism, which he opposes to Coleridge's superior sense of 
the figurative nature of language. For example, he blames Wordsworth for 
his inability to Ucome to grips with the figurative as it was used in 'The An-
cient Mariner" (92), or for reading Coleridge'S conversation poems 'with the 
same inattention to their figurative nature as he tried to read nature itself' 
(141). Secondly, readers who might still cling to notions inherited from new 
criticism concerning the autonomy and singularity of texts, might find Mag-
nuson's emphasis on contextual readings to be exaggerated. It is certainly a 
legitimate question, regardless of one's critical orientation, whether UTintern 
Abbey' can be read in the context of 'Frost at Midnight" as "an optimistic 
affirmation of a continuity of personal growth grounded in nature's continu-
ous ministry and in the 1anguage of the sense' that is direct and 
unambiguous' (177). Such a view contradicts the elegiac mood of the poem 
as experienced by so many readers, its constant return to new beginnings 
that refuse to yield the consolations sought by the speaker or erase the sense 
of loss that cannot be accomodated to his avowed philosophy of recompense. 
We do not need a different context provided by the Goslar drafts for the 
early Prelude or the Lucy poems to undo the "calm assurances" of 'Tintern 
Abbey." Wordsworth's doubts are imbedded in the poem itself, irrespective 
of the contexts of other writing. 
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A more general objection concerns Magnuson's assessment of the Cole-
ridge-Wordsworth relationship. Studies of this relationship have changed 
over the years, from fairly sentimental versions of the kinship between the 
two poets to radical demystifications of their presumed affinity for one an-
other, as exemplified by Parrish's pioneering work on the Lyrical Ballads, or 
more recently by Lucy Newlyn's analysis of the "disparity, aggression, or 
unease" underlying the public myth of "shared assumptions and common 
aims" that both poets helped generate (Coleridge, Wordsworth, and the Lan-
guage of Allusion [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986], viii). Magnuson returns u" 
to a more optimistic evaluation of this relationship. He deliberately avoids an 
agonistic model as popularized by Bloom's theory of the anxiety of influence, 
not only because it applies to the struggle between a poet and a precursor, 
but because it will not accommodate Magnuson's representation of the poetic 
exchange between Coleridge and Wordsworth as a nurturing and non-ag-
gressive relationship, abiding by the rules of polite conversation rather than 
egotistical self-assertion. As Magnuson describes it, the so called "lyrical 
dialogue" between Coleridge and Wordsworth seems to be guided by the 
conventions of aristocratic decorum rather than the histrionics of oedipal dis-
turbances: "After listening to the other poet," the critic writes, "each has the 
opportunity of responding" (ix). Magnuson even departs from Bakhtin's phi-
losophy of dialogic reading to which he is indebted, noting the absence of 
parody in the dialogue between Coleridge and Wordsworth, which is marked 
instead by "shared themes and voices" (ix-x). And yet we know that parody-
ing one another was so common a ground of self-definition for each poet 
(one need only think of Wordsworth's parody of the supernatural in "The Id-
iot Boy" or "Peter Bell") that it led David Erdman to assume that "The Mad 
Monk" was not Wordsworth's poem, but a Coleridgean parody of Words-
worth. Magnuson's sanitized account of the cavalier dialogue between Cole-
ridge and Wordsworth not only ignores its disabling impact on each poet, but 
is contradicted by ample evidence in the book of misreadings and disagree-
ments between the two writers. Magnuson's own definition of various kinds 
of lyric turns, which always involve some form of negation or rewriting of a 
previous text (22-27), is much closer to a Bloomian perspective than the critic 
is willing to admit. 
Yet there remains an essential difference between Bloom's model of the in-
teraction between two writers and Magnuson's position, primarily because 
Magnuson, who is not interested in Freudian psychology, draws his agonistic 
vocabulary from an entirely different tradition, namely the romantic philoso-
phy of organicism. Even though Magnuson is opposed to some of the prem-
ises of organicism, attacking the notion of "an organic metaphor of develop-
ment, in which the end is implied in the beginning" (30), or of the perfected 
and inviolable work of art, he is clearly operating within the tenets of this 
tradition when he claims that Coleridge'S and Wordsworth's poetry should 
be read as parts of "an intricately connected wholeR or as stanzas of a single 
ode. More importantly, it is organicism that allows Magnuson to talk about 
the opposition between Coleridge and Wordsworth in paradoxically non-
conflictual terms. As is well known, any notion of polarity in organic philoso-
phy is predicated on the assumption of an underlying unity to which all po-
larity points and into which it is ultimately absorbed. But in adopting this :1 
I 
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view one may end up sacrificing the individuality and distinctness of the 
parts that constitute the polar tension of this all engulfing unity, a fact to 
which Coleridge became increasingly sensitive when he tried to incorporate 
dynamic philosophy into his schema for the trinity. Magnuson seems una-
ware of the extent to which he reached the dead end of organicism, when he 
states that the "dialogue between Coleridge and Wordsworth begins in the 
recognition that the initial condition of their dialogue is identity and opposi-
tion. It continues in the hope, unfulfilled, that it could realize distinction and 
difference" (8 n.). Distinction and difference were actually present from the 
very beginning of the interaction between Coleridge and Wordsworth, but it 
is not surprising that they do not surface in a study that subscribes to the 
principles of organic philosophy. As Newlyn rightly suspected, the idea of an 
original unity of mind between Coleridge and Wordsworth was a myth in-
vented by the two poets in keeping with the dominant romantic philosophy 
of the time. 
These limitations do not, however, detract significantly from the overall 
quality of Magnuson's study which represents a major reassessment of Cole-
ridge's relationship with Wordsworth. As a textual critic Magnuson is invaria-
bly stimulating and insightful in his reading of Coleridge's and Wordsworth's 
poetry. As a scholar he is indefatiguable in hunting for the earliest drafts and 
versions of poems and the connections he uncovers between these and later 
versions constitute an invaluable fund of new knowledge for students of the 
romantic period. Magnuson has done the kind of meticulous work with man-
uscript versions of poems that few of us undertake gladly, but which seems 
imperative in view of the recent material made available by the Cornell 
Wordsworth edition. In addition to new perspectives on the Coleridge-
Wordsworth dialogue, Magnuson's study will encourage a reevaluation of 
Wordsworth's poetry, which he views as a poetry of many beginnings and 
stages of transition, whose origins are often hidden in cancelled fragments 
and false starts, as well as in the earliest versions of Coleridge's poems. 
University of Washington Raimonda Modiano 
Romantic Texts and Contexts by Donald H. Reiman. Columbia: Univ. of Mis-
souri Press, 1988. Pp. ix + 395. $32.00 (cloth). 
Intervals of Inspiration, The Skeptical Tradition and the Psychology of Romanti-
cism by Donald H. Reiman. Greenwood: Penkevill Publishing Company, 
1988. Pp. xxiii + 449. $30.00 (cloth). 
To have published two books within twelve months attests to Reiman's 
stature as a leading Romanticist. One book is a collection of essays strung to-
gether by fascinating prefaces that describe the circumstances and occasion 
for each essay. Half the essays deal with issues related to editing Romantic 
texts, and the other half are interpretive essays on Romantic literature, mostly 
poetry. Another book is Reiman's ambitious effort to synthesize English Ro-
manticism in an extended argument centering on philosophical skepticism 
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and the "psychology of Romanticism. n Both books are valuable contributions 
to Romanticist studies and make as well a provocative gesture in the theoreti-
cal battle of the books by sustaining pugnaciously what one might call the 
old historicism. 
In the introduction to Romantic Texts and Contexts Reiman spells out his 
theoretical assumptions in a typically clear and frank manner. Textual criti-
cism, historical scholarship, and literary criticism constitute the field of study 
and comprise three interrelated focuses that bear on one another. The first 
task is to arrive at a reliable text, which Reiman demonstrates is not easy 
given the all too often sloppy and misguided practices of editors. (How Rei-
man defines a reliable text is interesting and relevant to his literary theory.) 
This text is then historicized by reconstructing what the author intended for a 
specific audience. Finally, the critic evaluates the work's contemporary rele-
vance. 
For the literary theory assumed by Reiman, one could turn to E. D. 
Hirsch's Validity in Interpretation, which elaborates in philosophical detail 
objective hermeneutics. Objective hermeneutics or old historicism-by rea-
son of the "new" historicism-assumes that the meaning of a text can be sta-
bilized by reference to an author-the original intention, the historically 
specific shared values and aesthetic conventions of audience and author, the 
psychology of the author, the socio-historical factors putting constraints on 
meaning. Historicism was actually out of favor during the heyday of the New 
Criticism-indeed, New Criticism was in part a reaction against historicism. 
Historicism has been a favorite target for the new literary approaches at least 
since the sixties: the death of the author, the intentional fallacy, the decen-
tered text, the instability of textual meaning, and so on. Historicism has been 
attacked by-among others-Heideggerians, deconstructionists, post-struc-
turalists, and Marxists for a variety of theoretical errors and inadequacies. 
What strikes me, however, is how enduring is the historicist project despite 
the critiques. From at least Schleiermacher-or is it Gibbon, or perhaps even 
Spinoza?-historicism has insisted upon a knowable text whose meaning can 
be reconstructed by various more or less repeatable methods. Historicism has 
always been vulnerable to critique but at its best its practitioners have 
avoided dogmatism and simplistic interpretation. Indeed, the best historicists 
have utilized intuition, artfulness, sensitivity to nuance, and risky speculation 
in their reconstructions of meaning and have not relied exclusively on objec-
tive procedures. Reiman's criticism is in the best traditions of historicism. 
Historicism has survived and prospered because in part it has been eclectic 
and adaptive, taking what it can use from competing methods without be-
traying its primary commitment to objective meaning. One line of critique 
against historicism has centered on the "reader" or critic who, within the his-
toricist paradigm, is a mythically lucid interpeter without ideological or per-
sonal bias. Romantic Texts and Contexts, however, exercises an extraordinary 
degree of self-reflexiveness and self-scrutiny, thus subverting the image of 
the historicist as disinterested scientist. The italicized commentary connecting 
together the various essays reveals the circumstances which led up to the 
writing of each article, discussing with whom he studied, corresponded, 
argued and so on; he provides us with some gossip and academic trivia most 
academics love to read about; he also confesses at times to his own errors, 
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misguided enthusiasms and changes of opinion, but for the most part he up-
holds his former writings as having withstood critical examination. Just as 
when Reiman studies a text he researches the author's life from which that 
text issued, so he has provided us with some contextual information which is 
intrinsically interesting-providing an intriguing glimpse into English aca-
demic life from the fifties onwards-and helps us better evaluate his criti-
cism. I favorably compare Reiman's self-revelations and nitty-gritty details to 
the Olympian aura over the collection of essays by Geoffrey H. Hartman, 
whose The Unremarkable Wordsworth contains only a brief introduction by the 
author and a much longer "Foreword" by someone else. 
Reiman believes an editor should present texts to the reading public which 
come as close as possible to what that text's contemporary readers con-
fronted, or-in cases where the author could not oversee the correction of a 
published text-which most closely approximate what seems to be the au-
thor's intention. In reviewing various editions of Romantic texts, Reiman is 
unforgiving of sloppiness, laziness, and carelessness, but he is most exercised 
by editorial interventions which result in various "modernizing" effects, thus 
corrupting the text's historical integrity, its strangeness. To modernize the 
spelling or punctuation of a Romantic text is, for Reiman, to destroy the text's 
integrity as an object of the past. When the sense of a line or sentence is ob-
scured by peculiar spelling or punctuation, the editor can in a footnote clarify 
the sense without tampering with the text. More than a few editors have si-
lently modernized texts so that future editors will have to redo all the work 
of collation. This is especially reprehensible because textual editors, privi-
leged recipients of grant money and publishing contracts, have responsibili-
ties to consumers of their texts and future generations of readers. 
Modernized speiling and punctuation are hardly the only faults Reiman 
finds in various editions. Some editors have been spectacularly sloppy and 
wildly free with editorial emendations. Both qualities come in part from the 
spirit of the age, which is anti-historical and subjectivist. Neville Rogers, for 
example, could tamper so clumsily with Shelley'S texts because he believed 
that, after all, Shelley did not really care about the final product read by real 
readers as the "real Shelley" existed in a Platonic realm of pure ideas and im-
ages. The Cornell Wordsworth, to take an example of a much higher calibre, 
is vitiated to some extent by its own anti-historical bias: factual matters deal-
ing with history, biography, and geography are routinely and regularly over-
looked in the notes (136-37), and the bias in favor of a young, supposedly 
unrepressed and "natural" Wordsworth-and therefore more creative Words-
worth-is never fully acknowledged or discussed. Drafts of poems Words-
worth never intended for publication are turned by editors into "reading 
texts" for advanced scholars and Reiman worries that these drafts will sup-
plant the texts authorized by the author himself (135). 
The most interesting textual controversy is of course The Prelude, whose 
different versions have been reproduced carefully in the Cornell Wordsworth 
and the Norton Prelude. Reiman is convinced that the 1799 and 1805 texts 
were never intended by Wordsworth to be published poems, that the 1850 is 
a far superior poem to the 1805 (though the latter is more autobiographically 
revealing (153», and that "the only criterion for judging a text authoritative is 
the author's final intention .. ." (153). Reiman is disturbed that students will 
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be paying more attention to texts Wordsworth never wanted published than 
to texts he authorized. If we do not follow the author's wishes when they are 
ascertainable, as they are in Wordsworth's case, then we are left with merely 
subjective preference. Reiman does not object to rescuing drafts from the ob-
livion of mouldy manuscripts-indeed, he himself has launched several se-
ries of Romantic publications which make available to a general readership 
once rare manuscripts (The Manuscripts of the Younger Romantics and The 
Bodleian Shelley Manuscripts)-but he believes these are for advanced stu-
dents of Wordsworth's work, not first-time readers. Aside from the questions 
of taste, there are interesting ethical questions raised by the different versions 
of The Prelude. What if the 1805 version were substantially better than the 
1850? I agree with Reiman that the 1850 really is the better poem, but what 
if it were not? Would we still have to teach the authorized version? A practi-
cal solution to the problem of different versions is what Reiman calls 
'versioning: a topic to which he devotes an entire chapter (167-80). Rather 
than try to create an ideal text, editors should 'redirect [their] energies· for 
·the production of editions of discrete versions of works· (179). This is an in-
telligent, pragmatic approach that circumvents the thorny issues of intention-
ality. Or should I say ·defers· rather than circumvents because after all we 
must decide which version of the text to teach our students and to write 
about; these decisions are unavoidable and have serious ethical conse-
quences. Reiman's tireless work as a watchdog for sloppy and incoherent tex-
tual work has made it possible for us to make these decisions in a more 
knowledgable fashion. 
The second half of Romantic Texts and Contexts is comprised of nine previ-
ously published essays and a brief afterword. It is valuable to have all the es-
says in one place and to have as well the informative prefaces which provide 
an interesting commentary. His strengths as a critic are apparent after reading 
these essays: his intellectual curiosity, his encyclopedic knowledge of the 
lives and writings of the Romantics, his stubborn trust in his own methods of 
inquiry, and a rich sense of the contexts in which Romanticism was gener-
ated. Disputing the originality of Keats's humanistic naturalism, Reiman 
points to classical precedents and the Pervigilium Veneris (which turns out to 
be a favorite Latin text for schools in the early nineteenth century). To illumi-
nate some obscure lines in Prometheus Unbound, he reconstructs Shelley'S 
own itinerary in Rome and describes the 'Roman Scenes.· Similarly, he 
helped clarify The Triumph of Life simply by reading carefully what Shelley 
had read and referred to many times, Rousseau's Julie. What could have been 
a merely factual philolOgical gloss on the Maid of Buttermere section in Book 
VII of the Prelude becomes a rich exploration of different Romantic responses 
to the same cause celebre. Reiman has a good instinct for what we might call 
the obvious: his educated common sense serves him well. In his sociologi-
cally oriented criticism he has even adapted some Marxist ideas, as in 
'Shelley as Agrarian Reactionary: but in his many biographically and psy-
chologically oriented essays he steers away from any specialist knowledge, in 
particular psychoanalytic concepts. As any reader of his psychologically 
slanted essays knows, Reiman is a subtle interpreter of human motives, but I 
cannot see any advantages to being untutored in psychoanalysis if one's fo-
eus is the psychosexual meaning of literary works. Here is one instance 
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where his intellectual curiosity should have provoked him to rely on more 
than just common sense. 
Another problem with Reiman's criticism is its gratuitous att"acks on the 
motives of his critical opponents. Although he sneers at jargon-laden critical 
ideas imported from the Continent as merely faddish, his own critical ap-
proach is hardly horne-grown. Who is to say what is a fad and what is not? 
The origin of an idea, whether it is Paris or Topeka, is hardly the most rele-
vant issue, and I find the neo-Ernersonian populism of the If Afterword" un-
convincing. Intellectual protectionism is not an adequate response to decon-
struction and post-structuralism. Reiman's most effective response is actually 
his scholarly and critical work at their best which show in actuality an histo-
ricist criticism that is interesting and provocative. Reiman is a spirited but not 
an effective polemicist in the theory wars. 
Although parts of Intervals of Inspiration are previously published articles 
which have been revised and reworked, the new book is in fact new and 
reads like a book not a collection of essays. I cannot hope to do justice to Rei-
man's argument, which depends on elaborate detail and close readings of 
many different texts, but I will try to present a very truncated summary. The 
English Romantics are distinctive and share an identity not simply by having 
lived through the French Revolution and its aftermath but by having under-
gone remarkably similar psychological experiences which at an early age 
turned them into" outsiders" (xvii), through either the loss of their parents or 
alienation from their families. They were furthermore alienated from "the 
two main value-systems of their day" (xix), namely aristocratic Christianity 
and middle-class utilitarianism. Turning to the skeptical philosophical tradl-
tion for intellectual justification, they tried "to create a new social order out of 
internalized value systems from other eras" (xix). Near the end of the book 
he articulates the heart of his argument: "To be relevant in the Romantic pe-
riod, a major poet had to be, to one extent or another, a Skeptic just as surely 
as in Dante's time and place he had to be a Christian. Without Skepticism in 
some form, the intellectual climate dictated that the poet would either sink 
under the dead weight of an outworn Anglican orthodoxy or else chain his 
conscience to one of the anti-humanist alternative orthodoxies then current-
Calvinism, Methodism, or rationalist utilitarianism" (347). In separate chap-
ters he deals with all the Romantic poets except for Blake, and there is a 
chapter devoted to Lamb and Hazlitt, as well as an initial chapter devoted to 
philosophical skepticism. 
Although the relevance of skepticism to Romantic literature has been writ-
ten about before, especially in relation to Shelley, no critic until now has so 
highlighted the importance of skepticism. The first chapter provides a useful 
history of the skeptical tradition from classical times through the medieval, 
Renaissance, Enlightenment and nineteenth-century eras. The historical over-
view permits him to speculate on the socio-historical factors conducive to 
skepticism: skeptics tend to be ideological conservatives trying to preserve 
humanistic values threatened by powerful innovative forces or entrenched 
dogmatism; they tend to be also practical liberals favoring tolerance in that 
they cannot sanction "persecuting those who disagree with their opinions" 
(11). Skepticism does not seem to flourish in either a rigidly closed society or 
a genuinely tolerant one (5). The Romantics could use the skeptical tradltion 
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to carve out a space for themselves free from religious orthodoxy or the 
emergent Philistinism which was to define the Victorian age (46). The Ro-
mantic legacy then is the anti-utilitarian line of post-Romantic writing from 
Carlyle to Wilde (49), more or less the line of development and influence de-
veloped by Raymond Williams (although there are no references to Wil-
liams). 
There is no space in which to summarize each chapter so my comments 
will be highly selective. To me the best chapter is the third on Coleridge 
where Reiman's method of psycho-biography plus close reading of texts 
yields an especially interesting and original interpretation of Biographia Liter-
aria as a kind of Tristram Shandy, a convoluted and ornate if elegant joke. 
Coleridge's "equivocation" and artful rhetoric and playfulness fit in nicely 
with the skeptical hypothesis as well as the "psychology" of the outsider. 
Lamb's Elia writings also fit in nicely with Reiman's thesis. The psychological 
analysis of Wordsworth's desire for community as a constant thread in the 
development of his writing and thought is subtle and interesting in showing 
the continuity within the discontinuity, with community-in its various in-
carnations-as a refuge from alienation. The Shelley chapter emphasizes 
Peacock's skeptical influence in an unprecedented way. The Keats chapter is 
an effective expansion of the previously published essay on the humanistic 
dilemma and the final chapter is a canonizing of Byron's Don Juan as the 
greatest Romantic poem, the ultimately skeptical poem which affirms nothing 
but represents "everything." 
In terms of canon and evaluation, Reiman's skeptical legacy is very 
different from Bloom's visionary company, within which Byron never fit very 
well. Whereas Blake was for Bloom the ultimate Romantic and visionary, Rei-
man has not even one chapter on Blake. As is obvious from the italicized 
commentary in Romantic Texts and Contexts, Bloom has long been on Rei-
man's mind as a critical antagonist (see, e.g., 322, where Reiman calls Bloom 
the most gifted critic of the age but also the "lost leader"). It seems to me that 
Reiman's Intervals of Inspiration is to some extent a belated "answer" to 
Bloom's own synthesis of Romanticism. I mean belated because Paul de Man 
has replaced Bloom as the most imposing theoretical presence in Romantic 
studies. As, however, deconstruction announces itself as a form of skeptical 
inquiry, Reiman's own appropriation of skepticism is also a gesture in that 
direction, which is quite explicit at one point where he refers to "mere rhetor-
ical analysis" as less significant than "literary studies that involve the lives 
and creative impulses of the authors" (xv). 
Before concluding this review, I wish to take note of the surprisingly nu-
merous typos in Intervals of Inspiration. As a stickler for careful proofreading, 
Reiman has to be concerned by the quantity of misprints. Secondly, I would 
like to comment if only briefly on the old and new historicisms. A new histo-
ricist would probably refrain from explicitly canonizing any single work as 
Reiman does with Don Juan. Nor would a new historicist be so slighting of 
"marginal" figures not at the center of the skeptical project-someone like 
Blake for example. Furthermore, a new historicist, in stabilizing literary 
meaning, would stress ideology or broader socio-historical factors more, and 
psycho-biography less; more contradiction, less coherence. Even so, the real 
differences are not as substantial as the different labels would lead one to be-
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lieve. New historicists do their own canonizing, even if they are not as una-
bashed about it as is Reiman. Despite differences in substance and style, I am 
struck by how much the two have in common, especially when one com-
pares any kind of historicism with the explicitly anti-historical procedures of 
deconstruction and other modes of formalism. 
Reiman's two books will hardly settle the battle of the books over compet-
ing literary theories but these books articulate forcefully a particular approach 
to Romantic literature that cannot be ignored and that Romanticists of all crit-
ical persuasions will find useful. 
Wayne State University Michael Scrivener 
L'Entreprise me!odramatique, by Julia Przybos. Paris: Jose Corti, 1987. Pp. 194. 
$35.00 (paper). 
This study of French melodrama of the early nineteenth century is indeed 
an ambitious undertaking. It attempts to examine the social, material, and 
aesthetic conditions of melodrama's production, to provide a theoretical ex-
planation for its popularity, to identify its significance as a representation of 
French conscience of the early 1800's, to offer a close reading of a "typical" 
text, and to assemble a network of interpretive models that will explain melo-
drama's conventions. The result is a work that is frequently interesting and 
suggestive, but that lacks some consistency and the coherence of a control-
ling thesis or methodology. 
Early chapters provide a useful documentation of historical facts. The au-
thor appears to have read not only all the available plays written between 
1800 and 1830, but also most of the newspapers, chronicles, theatrical dic-
tionaries, memoirs and even production records of specific theaters. The text 
is studded with anecdotes (employers complained of worker absenteeism be-
cause of Monday matinees), statistics on prices, attendance, production runs, 
and repertories. It offers glimpses of the theaters and theater district, refresh-
ment concessions, advertising strategies, the dress of the audience, spectator 
reaction during representations, reviews of specific successes and flops, and 
more. We have a picture of melodrama as a commercial venture (a popular 
and financial success), insights on how the plays were written (usually 
"manufactured" in a few days, with imitation, plagiarism and a constant re-
newal of "special effects" as the nonn), and examples of how audience recep-
tion determined revisions. 
Chapters three through five develop a socia-political and theoretical frame-
work for understanding the melodrama based primarily on Girard's scape-
goat model. Stated briefly, the argument here is that the highly conventional 
social, religious and moral hierarchy of the melodrama represents a nostalgia 
on the part of the early nineteenth-century public for a return to the stable 
structures and values of the Ancien Regime (hierarchized classes, patriarchy 
and Christian ethics). The dramatic conflict of the play, triggered when the 
villain falsely accuses an innocent victim of some crime, introduces general 
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confusion, disorder and upheaval in the community and in nature and repre-
sents the violence and "transgressions" of the Revolution. Social and moral 
harmony are reinstated when the villain is unmasked, usually by a represent-
ative of divine justice, and banished from the community, an act that for the 
viewing public represents both a ritual purging of "revolutionary" impulses or 
memories and a celebration of pre-Revolutionary ideolpgy. Historically, this 
would reflect the restoration of the Bourbons and a return to peace, harmony 
and reconciliation. Although the author does not establish a convincing argu-
ment as to how this ideology relates to the particular class structure and 
changing conflicts of the period, her model does offer a comprehensive 
scheme for identifying the primary conflict and its underlying ideology in the 
plays she examines. Details of this conflict and its ideology are provided 
through a close examination of Victor Ducange's Therese, au l'arpheline de 
Geneve (1820). 
The analysis of this play at the same time attempts to outline the conven-
tions and formal structures of the melodramatic genre. Plot will dramatize 
the scapegoat scenario previously announced, characters and costumes will 
primarily symbolize moral categories (victim, traitor, saviour and commu-
nity), decor and stage space (castle, garden, country) will most often repre-
sent social relationships, while the quality of speech itself (inarticulate for the 
victim, eloquent for the traitor, "truthful" for the savior) will echo these cate-
gories. Much effort in these discussions is spent invoking theoretical or criti-
cal models that will support or justify the author's analysis. For example, the 
fact that the victim does not defend him or herself against accusations is due 
either to mutism, to the inability of the community to recognize his or her 
innocence, or to the "scandal" of the truth-she was raped by a priest-and 
can be seen, in communication theory, as a "fault" in either the "destinateur/' 
the "destinataire" or the "message." Similarly, an elaborate "semiotic" analysis 
of costumes reveals that black is the color of the villain, white that of inno-
cence and gray the moral fluctuations of the community. The problem is not 
that such applications are incorrect, or that they frequently reveal only the 
obvious, but rather that they are applied in an ad hoc way and consistently 
fragment rather than reinforce the theoretical framework of the study. At the 
same time, two important theoretical works dealing directly with French mel-
odrama (Brooks, 1976; Prendergast, 1978) are all but ignored. 
Chapters seven and eight examine communication models in melodrama, 
emphasizing particularly the role of the spectator. Speech (along with other 
signifying systems) in the theater involves two "circuits" for transmitting in-
formation, first, the circuit for "fictional" communication between the charac-
ters (actors) on the stage, and, secondly, the circuit for messages directed pri-
marily at the audience. In melodrama, it is argued, the second circuit regu-
larly places the spectator in a condition of knowledge superior to that of the 
characters, to the point that the audience anticipates not only the elements of 
the dramatic conflict but its solution as well. How, then, it is asked, in the 
face of such cliches and pre-ordained outcomes, is audience interest or 
"pleasure" sustained? By a balanced distribution of "intellectual" and 
"emotional" episodes, the latter orchestrated by the participation of the 
"claque. 11 The last chapter considers melodrama as a work of moral, social and 
political propaganda and concludes, with references to Durkheim, by propos-
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ing the spectacle of melodrama as a ritualistic event in which individuals re-
experience their society and the relationships they have with it. In nine-
teenth-century France, however, the ceremony has the additional characteris-
tic of being an economically controlled enterprise. 
Although much of its borrowed theoretical apparatus is inconsequential, 
this study is nevertheless informative and makes a useful contribution to our 
understanding of French melodrama in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century. 
Northwestern University Gerald Mead 
The Bible Tells Them So: The Discourse of Protestant Fundamentalism by Kath-
leen C. Boone. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1989. Pp. 139. $34.50 
(cloth), $10.95 (paper). 
When the AmeriGan intelligentsia regards "fundamentalism" at all, its sev-
eral responses bear an odd commonality. At times it assumes the posture of 
some late Byzantine emperors, peering nervously over the walls at the invad-
ing Ostrogoth hordes, perfumed handkerchiefs pressed tight to noses. At 
other times it recalls the jaded sophisticate's amusement with elaborately 
staged carnival entertainments put on by countrified fools. When considered 
"seriously," as with Martin Marty and company's recently heralded efforts, 
the result is a massively ponderous five-year plan aimed at explaining this 
"phenomenon." Seemingly different, all these responses have at base the 
same essential: that these people are other. Dangerously so, comically so-
they are not us. It is a convenient and dismissive reading, made easily avail-
able to us by the repetitive foci of the electronic media's spectacles, but while 
Imelda Marcos's shoes seem a perfectly adequate symbol for that particular 
brand of eighties madness, Tammy Faye Bakker's mascara, somehow, does 
not. 
The penetration of that cosmetic facade, whoever may bear responsibility 
for its application, is one of the avowed aims of this book. It is at first glance 
curious in its use of Foucault as theoretical backing, in that his work is so us-
able, so manipulable, that Foucauldian insight might serve as the same re-
source of authoritative appeal here that the Bible does for fundamentalists. 
But Boone's approach is sustained by the knowing irony that it is just this 
importation of authority, the ground of a stance for speaking, that is under 
investigation. Such a conception also allows the wicked juxtaposition on ad-
joining pages of Foucault and Falwell, thus demonstrating that this book's 
theoretical purport is larger than the popular conception of its subject. In a 
way, the syntax of the subtitle is misleading, in that while it promises what 
the book delivers, an analysis of the discourse of fundamentalism, the partic-
ularities of that analysis should not obscure Boone's major point: that protes-
tant fundamentalism is itself a discourse; in Foucault's multivalent senses of 
that word, as it loops away from individual control, it is multitextual, fleeting, 
interlocked. It is this recognition that underscores the book's essentially 
ironic stance, in that the mechanism for proclaiming interpretive inerrancy, 
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the hallmark of fundamentalism, is itself revealed to be its own systematic 
opposite. 
The trail of Boone's argument begins with the identification of E. D. 
Hirsch's demand for the determinacy of meaning in Validity in Interpretation 
with the demand for biblical inerrancy on the part of fundamentalist dis-
course, an assertion that would have seemed strange and perhaps unfair be-
fore the publication of Cultural Literacy, but not afterward. Countered to this 
are Stanley Fish's notion of competing interpretive communities, and Fou-
cault on the exigencies of discourse. While the full richness of these theories 
is necessarily somewhat flattened here by abbreviation, they are by no means 
off the mark, and their presentation as dynamic oppositions forms the 
groundwork for an extended discussion of the "theological" issue of biblical 
inerrancy, ending with the paradoxical realization that one seeking inerrancy 
is left instead only with "rules and strategies" of reading. Boone's painstaking 
examination of the paradoxes at the heart of fundamentalism-hyper-
rational anti-intellectualism, a peculiarly metaphoric literalism-forms one of 
the chief rewards of this book, and allows her to offer striking explanations 
of the belief in the millennium and the rapture that go beyond the socio-
psychological to the ground of Bible belief as essential and "fundamental," 
even to the extent of explaining the contradictions of a fundamentalist call to 
political action in a world that is bound by revelation to end soon and in 
chaos. 
Boone's analysis of the particulars of fundamentalism ranges from the per-
sistent interpretive energy exercised by the Scofield Bible (despite inerrancy 
and the common man's apprehension), the use of jargon and cliches, institu-
tional activity, and fundamentalist insularity, to the specifics of organiza-
tional, witnessing and counseling practices, and the careful construction and 
maintenance of the pastor's persona. The book is heavily documented, rigor-
ously and patiently argued, reliant on such previous studies as James Barr's 
Fundamentalism but wide enough in scope to engage H. 1. Mencken and 
Mark Twain's Letters to the Earth. As interesting as these minutiae are, how-
ever, their import pales beside Boone's more general thesis that Protestant 
fundamentalism is not by any means a set of theological dogmas, but is in-
stead a dynamic, adaptable interpretive strategy. Through close readings of 
various positions and posturings of fundamentalists (the wittiest of which is a 
clever close reading of close readings of Revelations 9), Boone shows that 
their sometimes wild statements are logical extensions and products of an in-
terpretive methodology, in fact a kind of critical theory of the Bible-what 
she terms "a tyranny of interpretation, in which authoritative interpreters are 
able to exercise power over their subjects by effacing the distinction between 
text and interpretation. n 
As postscript, there is to be found here as well the suggestion that, in the 
attention to the machinery of the author's authority, the unique status con-
ferred upon the text itself, and appeals to that text as ratification for interpre-
tations levi.ed upon it, some movements of contemporary critical theory mir-
ror fundamentalism. Thus, if this book reveals the irony of fundamentalists 
as themselves operating within discourse, it reveals as well the matter of lit-
erary theorists operating within and upon the fundamentalist dilemma. It is a 
glimpse only, tantalizingly provoked, but not followed up. Its extension 
148 Criticism, Vol. XXXII, No.1: Book Reviews 
would seem to require some notice of the apparent heterodoxy and studied 
avoidance of authoritarian positions within recent critical theory, and an ad-
dressing of the question whether the search for meaning contains the impulse 
of its own destruction, hidden in multiplicity and deferral. But that is a move 
from discourse analysis to deconstruction, and would be undertaken perhaps 
by one not only not saved, but irredeemably and gleefully lost. 
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